Abstract. In the Hidden Number Problem (HNP), the goal is to find a hidden number s, when given p, g and access to an oracle that on query a returns the k most significant bits of s · g a mod p. We present an algorithm solving HNP, when given an advice depending only on p and g; the running time and advice length are polynomial in log p. This algorithm improves over prior HNP algorithms in achieving:
Introduction
The Hidden Number Problem (HNP) was introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan [4] in the context of proving bit security for the Diffie-Hellman function. In HNP, for p a prime, and g a generator of Z * p , the goal is to find a hidden number s ∈ Z * p , when given p, g and oracle access to the function
mapping each a ∈ 1, . . . , p to the k most significant bits in the binary representation of s · g a mod p. Boneh-Venkatesan [4] gave an algorithm solving HNP for any k ≥ √ log p + log log p in running time polynomial in log p (aka, efficient). Subsequently, BonehVenkatesan [5] gave an efficient algorithm solving HNP for k ≥ Ω(log log p) provided the algorithm is given a short advice depending only on p and g (and not on s). Extensions to the case g is not a generator are given in [8, 14, 15 ].
New Result: Solving HNP with One Bit Oracle and Advice
We present an efficient algorithm solving HNP for any k ≥ 1, provided the algorithm is given a short advice depending only on p and g (and not on s).
Furthermore, our algorithm handles:
-Random noise. With high probability, our algorithm finds s even if the oracle answers are flipped independently at random with sufficiently small probability ε > 0. (Success probability is taken over the noise.) -Concentrated predicates. Our algorithm finds s even when oracle access is to the function P p,s (a)
where P = {P p } is any family of "concentrated" predicates. We say that P is concentrated if ∃c, δ s.t. ∀P p ∈ P, L 1 ( P p ) ≤ (log p) c and maj Noise is tolerated up to ε = c τ (P) for any c < 1 and for any τ (P) a lower bound on the maximum squared magnitude of the (non-trivial) Fourier coefficients of predicates P p ∈ P. In particular, for P the most significant bit, ε = O(1). 1 As a corollary of our algorithm for HNP, we obtain bit security results for Diffie-Hellman related functions.
Our result improves on prior HNP algorithms (and the corresponding bit security results) in achieving:
1. Optimal number of bits k ≥ 1 (rather than k ≥ Ω(log log p)); 2. Robustness to ε-random noise for substantial ε (e.g., ε is O(1) rather than O(1/ log p) for P = MSB k the k most significant bits); and 3. Handling the wide family of concentrated predicates (rather than only MSB k ).
New Tool: Universally Finding Significant Fourier Coefficients
As a central tool we present an algorithm that finds the significant Fourier coefficients of a complex valued functions f over Z p , when given oracle access to f (aka, SFT algorithm). Indexing Fourier coefficients by elements α in Z p , we say that α is τ -significant if its Fourier coefficient occupies at least τ -fraction of the energy
Our SFT algorithm, given p, τ , t, and oracle access to a function f over Z p s.t. L 1 ( f ) ≤ t, outputs all the τ -significant Fourier coefficients of f . Our SFT algorithm is: -Local. Its running time is polynomial in log p, 1/τ and t.
-Universal. For any p, τ and t, the same oracle queries are asked for all
With high probability, the algorithm succeeds even if the oracle to f is corrupted by random noise (probability is taken over the noise). Tolerated noise parameters are up to ε = cτ for any constant c < 1.
This improves over prior works in giving: (i) The first universal algorithm handling all functions f over Z p (complexity scales with L 1 ( f )). (ii) The first analysis proving robustness to noise in the context of universal SFT algorithms. We remark that these improvements are of independent interest in the context of sparse Fourier approximation, compressed sensing and sketching (cf. [3] ).
Comparison to other SFT algorithms. For functions over the boolean hyper-cube Z n 2 , Kushilevitz-Mansour (KM) gave a local universal SFT algorithm almost two decades ago [12] . Our algorithm matches the KM benchmark for the case of functions over Z p for any positive integer p.
For functions over Z p , prior SFT algorithms [6, 2, 7] are not universal. In concurrent works [10, 11] gave a universal SFT algorithm for a restricted class of functions over Z p : compressible or Fourier sparse functions.
2
Noise is out of scope in the analysis of the universal algorithms [12, 10, 11] . These SFT algorithms [12, 6, 2, 7, 10, 11] are insufficient for our result solving HNP. Both universality as well as handling functions that are neither compressible nor Fourier sparse are crucial for our algorithm solving HNP. Robustness to noise leads to robustness when solving HNP.
Techniques Overview
In HNP the goal is to find a hidden number s when given p, g and oracle access to a function P p,s . We reduce the HNP problem to the problem of the finding significant Fourier coefficients of a function f s defined by
for DL p,g (y), the discrete log of y, i.e., the a ∈ Z p−1 s.t. y = g a mod p. We then find the significant Fourier coefficients of f s using our universal SFT algorithm.
Universality is crucial. Finding the Fourier coefficients of f s requires access to f s . To read the values f s (y) on entries y it suffices to query P p,s on the discrete-logs DL p,g (y). With universal algorithms, access to all entries y read by the algorithm can be granted using an advice depending only on p. This is because universal algorithms read a fixed set of entries y for all the considered functions over Z p ; implying that the discrete-logs DL p,g (y) for all read entries y can be provided via an advice depending only on p. In contrast, with nonuniversal algorithms, providing access to f s is intractable (assuming computing discrete logs is intractable).
Achieving universality. We say that a set of queries S ⊆ Z p is good if we can find the significant Fourier coefficients of all considered function over Z p when reading only entries in S. We present a combinatorial condition on sets S, and prove that any set S satisfying this condition is good. Furthermore, we show that sets S satisfying the condition exists, and can be efficiently construction by a randomized algorithm. We remark that explicit constructions of such good sets are given in subsequent works [3] .
The combinatorial condition is that S = ∪ log p
for A a small biased set and B 's that are "small biased on [0..2 ]"; where we say that B has small bias on I if Fourier coefficients of (the characteristic function of) B approximate the Fourier coefficients of (the characteristic function) of I.
We prove that such sets S are good in two parts. First, for functions with bounded L 1 ( f ), we prove S is good using Fourier analysis. Second, for noise corrupted functions f = f + η, we prove S is good by showing the algorithm behaves similarly on the noisy and non-noisy functions. The latter is needed, as the Fourier approach fails for noisy f due to their typically huge
Comparison to prior works. Prior algorithms solving HNP follow a lattice based approach dating back to [4] , in which HNP is reduced to the problem of finding closest lattice vectors (CVP), and the latter is solved using LLL algorithm [13] . In comparison, we take a Fourier approach inspired by [2] . We compare the set of queries used in the different SFT algorithms. In the universal SFT algorithm for functions over the boolean hypercube Z n 2 [12] , the set of queries is constructed using small biased sets in Z n 2 , and the proof is Fourier analysis based.
In the (non-universal) SFT algorithms for functions over Z p [6, 2, 7] , the set of queries must be freshly chosen for each given input function f . Their analysis proves success with high probability over the sampled set of queries using deviation from expectation bounds.
In the universal SFT algorithm for (restricted class of) functions over Z p [10, 11] , the set of queries is constructed using "K-majority k-strongly selective sets".
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize preliminary terminology, notations and facts. In section 3 we present our algorithm solving HNP with advice. In section 4 we present our universal SFT algorithm. In section 5 we discuss bit security implications.
Preliminaries
In this section we summarize preliminary terminology, notations and facts.
Let N, Z, R and C denote the natural, integer, real and complex numbers respectively. Let P denote the set of all primes. Let Z N and Z * N denote the additive and the multiplicative groups of integers modulo N . We identify the elements of Z N with integers in 0, . . . , N −1, and denote abs(α) = min {α, N − α} for all α ∈ Z N . Let B r def = { z ∈ C | |z| ≤ r} denote the complex ball of radius r.
Fourier Transform
We give definitions and properties for normed spaces and Fourier transform.
Inner product, norms, convolution. The inner product of complex val-
Characters and Fourier transform. The characters of Z N are the functions A few useful properties of the Fourier transform follow.
Proposition 1. For any f, g:
Z N → C, 1. Parseval Identity: 1 N x∈ZN |f (x)| 2 = α f (α) 2 . 2. Convolution Theorem: (f * g)(α) = f (α) · g(α). 3. Phase Shift: For any α 0 ∈ Z N , if g = f · χ −α0 , then g(α) = f (α − α 0 ) (where subtraction is modulo N ). 4. Scaling: For any s ∈ Z * N , if g(x) = f (sx) ∀x, then g(α) = f (α · s −1 ) ∀α (
where multiplication and inverse are modulo N ).
Proof. Proof is standard, see [16] .
N a primitive root of unity of order N . By the formula for geometric sum S t (α) =
Assigning w β = cos(2πβ/N )+i sin(2πβ/N ) for β = αt in the numerator and β = α in the denominator and using standard trigonometric identities, we conclude that
. The upper and lower bounds on S t are obtained using the Taylor approximation for the cosine function:
Chernoff/Hoeffding Tail Inequality
The Chernoff/Hoeffding bound on the deviation from expectation of sums of independent random variables follows.
Proposition 3 (Chernoff/Hoeffding Bound [9]). Let X 1 , . . . , X t be independent random variables of expectations μ 1 , . . . , μ y and bounded values |X
i | ≤ M . Then, ∀η > 0, Pr[ 1 t t i=1 X i − 1 t t i=1 μ i ≥ η] ≤ 2 · exp − 2tη 2 M 2 .
Noise Models
We say that η is an ε-random noise if its values η(a), a ∈ Z p , are chosen independently at random from distributions of expected absolute values at most
We focus on additive noise η corrupting functions f to a function f = f + η. Without loss of generality, f and η accept values in the balls B 1 , B 2 respectively.
Solving Hidden Number Problem with Advice
In this section we present our algorithm solving with advice HNP P,ε . Fix a family of functions P = P p : Z * p → B 1 p∈P and a noise parameter ε.
Definition 1 (Hidden Number Problem).
In the (extended) Hidden Number Problem HNP P,ε the goal is to find a hidden number s ∈ Z * p , when given a prime p, a generator g of Z * p , and oracle access to the function
for η an ε-random noise.
Let , q, t be functions over P. We say that an algorithm ( , q, t)-solves HNP We present an efficient algorithm solving with advice HNP P,ε for concentrated P. We remark that concentration defined here differ than concentration in [2] .
Let M , τ and α be functions mapping indices p ∈ P into non-negative reals
Let τ (P) denote a lower bound on the maximum weight P p (α) 2 of non-trivial Fourier coefficients α = 0, for all P p ∈ P. 
for S ⊆ Z p a set of good queries for our universal SFT algorithm on input parameters p, τ (p) and
for all x ∈ Z * p and f s (0) = 0. Note that we can access f s (x) for all x ∈ S by querying P p,s on a = DL p,g (x) provided in the advice. Our algorithm for HNP P,ε follows.
Algorithm 1 Solving HNP P,ε .
1. Run the SFT Algorithm 2 on input p,τ (p),M (p), and oracle access to the restriction of f s to S; denote its output by L.
We show that Algorithm 1 outputs the hidden number s with probability (s · x) ). Therefore, the αs −1 -Fourier coefficient of P p,s is τ -significant, i.e.,
Thus L αs −1 with probability at least 1 − 1/p Ω(1) (by Theorem 4). Implying that
with probability at least
We conclude that the output is s with probability q(p) ≥ Ω(τ ). Finally, the advice length (p) and the running time t(p) are dominated by the query complexity and running time of the SFT Algorithm which is polynomial in log p, 1/τ (p) and M (p) (cf. Theorem 4).
Remark 1.
Tighter bounds on the success probability q(p) are possible at times. E.g., for the most significant bits P = MSB k for any k ≥ 1, q(p) ≥ 1/2.
Solving with Advice HNP
P,ε : Segment Predicates P
We solve with advice HNP P,ε for segment predicates P. Let P = P p : Z * p → {±1} p∈P . Let σ, a be functions mapping primes p to positive integers σ(p) and to elements a(p) ∈ Z * p . Denote by σ(P) an upper bound on σ(p) for all p.
Definition 3 (Segment Predicates [2]). P is a
c for all p.
We say that P is far from constant if ∃δ > 0 s.t. ∀p, maj(P p ) ≤ 1 − δ for maj(P p ) the frequency of P p 's most common value.
Theorem 2. Let P be a far from constant segment predicate and ε ≤ c/σ(P) for c < 1. Then there exists an algorithm that solves with advice HNP P,ε .
Proof. By Lemma 1, if P is a segment predicate, then P is concentrated; and furthermore, τ (P) ≥ 1/σ(P). By Theorem 1 this implies that there exists an algorithm that solves with advice HNP P,ε .
Proof. For each P p ∈ P, extend P p to a function over Z p by setting P p (0) = P p (1)
A segment predicate with a = 1 defines a partition of Z p into σ + 1 segments I j , so that P is a constant b j ∈ {±1} on each segment I j . Thus, we can express P as a sum, P = σ+1 j=1 P j , of functions P j : Z p → {−1, 0, 1} such that P j (x) is the constant P (x) for x ∈ I j and 0 otherwise. By the linearity of the Fourier transform, for all α ∈ Z p , P (α) = 
. We show that P (1) ≥ Ω(1/σ). Let j * be the length of the second longest segment in I 1 , . . . , I σ+1 . Clearly j * ≤ p/2. Moreover, j * ≥ Ω(p/σ) because for far from constant P, the longest segment is of length at most (1 − c)p for c > 0, implying that the second longest is of length at least the average length cp/σ over the remaining σ segments. By Proposition 2,
Consider next the case of a(p) = 1. By definition of segment predicates, there exists P s.t.
= Z p for any a co-prime to p), and P (a) = P (a · a −1 ) =
P (1) ≥ Ω(1/σ). We conclude that any family P of (σ, a)-segment predicates is (M, τ, α)-concentrated for M (p) ≤ O(σ(p) ln p), τ (p) ≥ Ω(1/σ(p)) and α(p) = a(p).

Solving with Advice HNP P,ε : The Single Most Significant Bit
We solve with advice HNP P,ε for P = MSB the single most significant bit.
Let MSB = M SB p : Z * p → {±1} p∈P the family of predicates giving the single most significant bit M SB p (x) of x (in a ±1 binary representation).
Theorem 3. For any ε = O(1) sufficiently small, there exists an algorithm that solves with advice HNP
MSB,ε .
Proof. For the most significant bit M SB p , M SB p (x + 1) = M SB p (x) only for one x ∈ Z * p . Namely, MSB is a family of (σ, a)-segment predicates with σ(p) = 1, a(p) = 1 for all p. By Theorem 2, this implies that for any ε = O(1) sufficiently small, there exists an algorithm that solves with advice HNP P,ε .
Universally Finding Significant Fourier Coefficients
In this section we present our universal SFT algorithm. In the following We present the combinatorial condition on good queries sets S; show such sets exists; and prove that our SFT algorithm succeeds even when given oracle access only to the restriction of the input function f to the entries in S.
We define good queries.
Denote by A − B the set of differences {a − b} a∈A,b∈B .
Definition 4 (Good Queries). Let S = {S N,τ,t } N,τ,t be a family of sets S N,τ,t ⊆ Z N . We say that S is good if for all N , τ , t and for
We remark that the meaning of "sufficiently small γ" depends on the considered noise parameter ε, specifically, on the ratio ε : τ . To simplify parameters, we fix this ratio to be, say, ε < 0.9τ .
We show that good queries S exist. Moreover, there is a randomized algorithm that constructs good sets S N,τ,t with high probability.
Proposition 4 (Good Queries Exist). There is a randomized algorithm that given N, τ and t, outputs S = S N,τ,t such that S is good with probability at least 1 − 1/N Ω(1) ; and its running time is O(|S|).
Proof. The algorithm outputs S = ∪ We show that our SFT algorithm succeeds when given oracle access to the restriction of the input function f (or its corruption by noise f = f + η) to good queries S = S N,τ,t . Denote this restriction by f |S def = {(x, f (x))} x∈S . Let S = {S N,τ,t } be any family of good queries. For any integer N > 0, reals τ, t > 0, a function f : Z N → B 1 s.t. L 1 ( f ) ≤ t, and an ε-random noise η for ε < 0.9τ the following holds. Our SFT algorithm, when given N , τ , t and f |SN,τ, The probability is taken over the random noise η. In particular, when there is no noise, the success probability is 1. 
Theorem 4 (SFT).
The SFT Algorithm
We give the details of our SFT algorithm. At a high level, the SFT algorithm is a binary search algorithm that repeatedly:
1. Partitions the set of potentially significant Fourier coefficients into two halves. 2. Tests each half to decide if it (potentially) contains a significant Fourier coefficient. This is done by estimating whether the sum of squared Fourier coefficients in each half exceeds the significance threshold τ . 3. Continues recursively on any half found to (potentially) contain significant Fourier coefficients.
At each step of this search, the set of potentially significant Fourier coefficients is maintained as a collection J of intervals: At the first step of the search, all Fourier coefficients are potentially significant, so J contains the single interval J = [1..N ]. At each following search step, every interval J ∈ J is partitioned into two sub-intervals J 1 and J 2 containing the lower and upper halves of J respectively, and the set J is updated to hold only the sub-intervals that pass the test, i.e., those that (potentially) contain a significant Fourier coefficient. After log N steps this search terminates with a collection J of length one intervals revealing the frequencies of the significant Fourier coefficients. For all frequencies α of the significant Fourier coefficients, we then compute as an
The heart of the algorithm is the test deciding which intervals potentially contain a significant Fourier coefficient (aka, distinguishing procedure). The distinguishing procedure we present, given an interval J, answers YES if its Fourier weight weight(J) = α∈J f (α) 2 exceed the significance threshold τ , and answers NO if the Fourier weight of a slightly larger interval J ⊇ J is less than τ/2. This is achieved by estimating the 2 norm (i.e., sum of squared Fourier coefficients) of a filtered version of the input function f , when using a filter h that passes Fourier coefficients in J and decays fast outside of J.
The filters h that we use for depth of the search are the (normalized) periodic square function of support size 2 or Fourier domain translations of this function:
The filter h = h ,c passes all frequencies that lie within the length N/2 interval J centered around c, and decays fast outside of J. The filtered version of f is f * h, and we estimate its 2 norm f * h 2 2 by the estimator:
for A, B 1 , . . . , B ⊆ Z N as specified in the definition of good queries 4. A pseudo-code of the algorithm follows. We denote intervals by the pair {a, b} of their endpoints. To simplify notations, we assume: (a + b )/2 is an integer (otherwise, appropriate flooring/ceiling is taken); f 2 = 1 (otherwise we normalize f it by dividing each read value by an energy estimator
Proof of Theorem 4
In this section we bring the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Let h ,c and est ,c (f ) be as defined in (1)- (2) . Fix a sufficiently small absolute constant c > 0. Consider condition (*) on f = f + η:
< cτ for all = 1, . . . , (log N ) , c ∈ Z N By Lemma 2, when (*) holds, the SFT algorithm outputs L ⊇ Heavy τ (f ) in running time polynomial in log N , 1/τ and t. By Lemma 3, when S is a good, (*) holds with probability at least 1 − 1/N Ω(1) over the noise η. Thus, the SFT algorithm outputs L ⊇ Heavy τ (f ) in time polynomial in log N , 1/τ and t.
Proving
We show that first, if (*') holds, then the
by Parseval Identity. Second, when S is good, (*') holds with high probability over the noise η. We conclude that |L| ≤ O(1/τ ) with high probability over the noise η. Details omitted from this extended abstract. We show that the SFT algorithm succeed on functions f satisfying (*). 
, and (2) h ,c * f
Proof. Denote h = h ,c . By Parseval Identity and the convolution theorem,
y=0 χ α (y) as defined in Proposition 2. The proof follows from the properties guaranteed in Proposition 2; details omitted from this extended abstract.
We show that when using a good set of queries S condition (*) holds (with high probability over the random noise η). 
We bound each of these terms. By Claim 22, (i) ≤ O(γL 1 ( f ) 2 log N ). By Claims 23-24, with probability at least 1 N ) ) and ε = O(τ ), with probability at least 1 − 3 exp (−Ω(|A| τ 2 )),
By union bound, this holds for all = 1, . . . , (log N ) with probability at least 1−3 exp (−Ω(|A| τ 2 )) log 
Combining both bounds we conclude that with probability at least
Claim 24. (iii) ≤ 2ε 2 + ε + O(τ ) with probability at least 1 − 2 exp(−Ω(|A| τ 2 )). 
Bit Security Implications
We obtain bit security results as a corollary of our algorithm solving HNP P,ε . We set some terminology. Let G = {g p } be a family of generators g p of Z * p . Let F = {f p } be a family of functions f p outputting secrets s when given public data P D p,g,s depending on the modulus p, a generator g and the secret s. Think of F as the underlying hard to compute function. Let P = {P p } be a family of predicates over Z * p . Denote by M B a "magic box" that, given p, g and P D p,g,s , outputs M B(p, g, P D p,g,s ) def = P p (s). We say that:
-P is as hard as F if there is an algorithm A that, given P D p,gp,s , oracle access to M B, and an advice depending only on p and g p , outputs the secret s with probability at least 1/poly(log p), while the running time and advice length are polynomial in log p. -F is G-accessible if there is an access algorithm that, given public data P D p,g,s for a secret s, and an element a ∈ Z p−1 , outputs public data P D p,g,s·g a for the secret s · g a mod p. The algorithm A runs Algorithm 1 while simulating oracle access to P p,s . By Theorem 1, the output is s with probability at least 1/poly(log p). We conclude that P is as hard as F .
Let OK and EL denote the underlying hard families of functions in the Okamoto conference key sharing scheme and in the (modified) ElGamal public key encryption scheme as defined in [5] . The analysis of [5] shows that OK (EL ) is G-accessible. We conclude therefore that for any concentrated predicate P, P is as hard as computing OK (EL ). In particular, this holds for P = M SB 1 .
